This paper asks if "higher education as a signal" helps explaining the comovements between college enrollment rate and skill premium for younger workers in the US from 1973 to 2005. In my model a continuum of agents, heterogeneous in talent and initial wealth, make schooling and working decisions: work now or take up college …rst? When college is very expensive only the wealthy can a¤ord it, hence the degree does not signal much as far as talent is concerned. When college becomes more a¤ordable the degree is a better signal of talent. If talent is valuable, per se, on the work place, the college premium should increase. The model is calibrated to match the basic observed moments of college enrollment and skill premium. For a certain class of production functions it can potentially generate almost all of the growth in college premium after 1985.
Introduction
The rise in the college wage premium -de…ned as the di¤erential between the wages of college and high school graduates -is a well-documented fact. As Card and Lemieux (2001) have shown, the skill premium evolves di¤erently for di¤erent age groups: younger workers (age 20 to 40) account for most to the growth of the premium. This paper asks: how much of this evolution can be reasonably explained by the idea that higher education is (also) a signal of talent? The intuition is simple: as college education becomes more a¤ordable the degree becomes an increasingly clear signal of talent; if talent, per se, is useful but unobservable in the working place, the college degree will be rewarded by an increasing premium. The data we seek to understand are reported in the following graph 1 The evolution of the aggregate skill premium is described, among others, by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) and various theories have been put forward to explain it. Katz and Murphy (1992) provide a supply and demand framework to account for the dynamics of wage distribution. Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998) rely on skill-biased technological change to rationalize the demand for skilled labor outpacing the supply. While their model involves assumptions on the, unobservable, quality of labor, Krusell, Ohanian, 1 For data source and construction, please refer to Section 3.1.
Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) show that the capital-skill complementarity can account for almost all of the growth in aggregate skill premium without any change in the unobservable. However, Card and DiNardo (2002) question the validity of these theories by pointing out that the skill premium does not grow at the same rate across age groups. Further to this, Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate a production model with imperfect substitution between workers from di¤erent age groups and attribute the rising college premium for younger workers to the slowdown of the growth in educational attainment starting with the 1950 cohorts. In contrast to all the aforementioned theories, this paper builds on the idea that education serves as a signaling device and asks how much it can help generating the observed growing college premium. While the application of this signaling story to understanding the trend in wage dispersion is new, the idea of education-asa-signal is obviously not: it dates back to Spence (1973) . Hendel, Shapiro and Willen (2005) bases their theory on similar intuition, but they ask a di¤erent question and this is independent work.
In the empirical literature, however, there has been an ample body of research since 1970s, testing the educational screening hypothesis against the traditional human capital accumulation hypothesis, reaching mixed conclusions: Riley (1979) , Hungerfor and Solon (1987) , Heywood (1994) , Lang and Kropp (1986), Bedard (2001) …nd empirical evidence in support of the signaling story, while Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) , Wolpin (1977) , Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) and Albrecht (1981) reach the opposite. Riley (2001) has a summary in its Section 5. Having quanti…ed the two hypotheses within a uni…ed framework, Fang (2006) …nds that college education enhances attendees' productivity by about 40% and productivity enhancement accounts for close to two-thirds of the college wage premium.
Taber (2001) o¤ers evidence in support of this paper, in that he …nds the increasing premium is more plausibly a result of increasing demand in unobservable ability than in skills acquired in school.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory, while
Section 3 simulates the model and compares its predictions with the data.
Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model 2.1 A Static Model: the Working of the Education Signal
A static model may help the reader's intuition. Assume personal talent is private information that is nevertheless useful in production. Firms can base their wage o¤er only on the observable signal, which consists of having attained, or not, a college degree. Everyone is born with a high school diploma.
The population has size one, half is endowed with high talent, ; and half with low talent . Let the distribution of wealth in the population be F ( ). College education has a …xed cost of Q. Assume that all those with wealth > Q go to college, hence, the fraction of people who goes to college is F (Q). Assume there is randomness in successfully completing college.
The probability of a high (low) talent person to complete college is p (p), with p > p. The wage o¤er is simply the expected talent conditional on the signal received.
With some algebra, we have the wage o¤er to college graduates,
and to high school graduates,
While W is a constant, W depends on the fraction of people that can a¤ord to go to college. Write x = 1 F (Q), we have
implying that the wage di¤erential increases together with college attendance. Next we embed this simple mechanism in a dynamic model of production.
The Working of the Signal in a Dynastic Model
This is a continuous time discrete-choice problem. Each agent is indexed by the pair ( ; k 0 ), where denotes talent, distributed in [0; ] according to a cumulative distribution function G( ); and k 0 is the initial endowment of
Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of labor. In each instant, an agent faces a discrete choice of whether going to college or not.
There are two implicit assumptions in this formulation. One, the o¤spring of the high (low) type remains high (low); since our main concern is not about social mobility, this assumption seems innocuous. Two, …rms cannot, through repeated interaction with an agent from the same dynasty, infer her type. Agents save a constant fraction of their income in each instant.
Saving must be positive, i.e. agents cannot borrow against future income.
College education requires a …xed cost Q > 0. The rest is the same as in the static model, with p( ), a monotone increasing function, representing the probability of completing college for type :
The Agents'Problem
In each instant of time, an agent ( ; k 0 ) decides whether to go to college or directly to the labor market. If he decides to go to college, he pays the …xed cost Q, after which one of the two possible states of nature is realized: he either completes college or not. After …nding a job, he works, consumes and saves a fraction of the his income. Agents are risk neutral and maximize the discounted sum of future consumption taking the rental rate of capital R(t) and the wages W (t); W (t) as given:
Since there is no disutility from labor, all agents supply 1 unit of labor inelastically. There is no capital depreciation. For ease of exposition, the time argument is suppressed when it does not cause confusion.
Lemma 1 If it is optimal for an agent with talent to go to college at t, then it is optimal for any agent who has talent greater than to go to college at t as long as his current capital holding k Q:
Intuitively, for an agent with talent attending college is convenient if
is positive. Because p( ) is increasing, this implies the result.
Production
In each period the representative …rm rents capital from the households and hires workers. I will look at two di¤erent classes of production functions.
The …rst class, call it P 1; is
where L H is the number of high school graduates and L C is the number of college graduates. Here high school graduates and college graduates are perceived as di¤erent inputs, i.e. they are assigned di¤erent jobs. The productivity of each group is its average talent, by Law of Large Numbers.
Implicitly, college education here is productive in the sense that successfully completing college equipts the college graduates with a particular set of skills that allow them to undertake a particular task. The elasticity of substitution between two types of labor is the same as their elasticity with capital. In constrast, the second class of production functions only employs aggregate labor and capital as its inputs, that is, skilled and unskilled labor are perfect substitutes:
In both cases, markets are competitive and the high school (or college)
graduates will be paid by their marginal product conditional on the signal.
Later, in the calibration section, I will explore the di¤erent quantitative implications of the two production functions. The total stock of capital is
and the total labor supply L(t) = 1; 8t. Following the tradition, skilled labor (or, unskilled) and college graduates (or, high school graduates) are used interchangeably.
Equilibrium De…nition 1 Equilibrium without credit markets
An equilibrium without credit markets of this economy is a list (c(t); k(t); sh(t))
for each agent ( ; k 0 ) and a list of prices (R(t); W (t); W (t)) given initial capital distribution F ( ) and distribution of talent G( ), the exogenous positive saving rate and the production technology, so that (i) Agents optimally make schooling decision sh(K(t)), given R(t); W (t); W (t);
(ii) Firm maximizes period pro…t;
(iii) Factor Markets clear.
To provide an analytically convenient environment, we will look at a special class of the equilibrium de…ned above, the pooling equilibria in which all agents optimally go to college as soon as they can a¤ord it. Before proving the existence of the pooling equilibria, I will prove the monotonicity of the wage di¤erential in enrollment under the proposed strategy pro…le, which will be useful in the construction of the equilibrium later. Let x be the fraction of agents who go to school and we have x = 1 F (Q):
The theoretical results here are presented mainly for P 1. An analogous characterization of equilibria with P 2 is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 For P 1; under the strategy pro…le that all types of agents go to college as soon as their current capital holdings k Q; for high and low Q, ln(W =W ) is increasing in the fraction, x, of agents going to college.
To facilitate interpretation, the wage di¤erential has the following for-
An increase in the attendance will unambiguously lead to a higher ratio of expected talents,
; by exactly the same logic as the static model. Imagine = 1, then the wage di¤erential will unambiguously go up. However, for < 1, the general equilibrium e¤ect kicks in. Since college graduates become more abundant, its marginal productivity decreases relative to that of high school graduates, and this mitigates the e¤ects of the signals.
For every Q, I can …nd a b 1, such that for all b , this monotonicity property of the wage gap holds. In general, the monotonicity of wage di¤er-ential rely also on small Q and high : Consider a separating equilibrium, in which higher types opt for school and lower types don't. Suppose that college is very expensive, hence few people can a¤ord it. Then a college degree is more correlated with wealth than with talent and the signal it contains is weak. The marginal productivity of skilled labor is high, hence skilled labor would be receiving a high payment, if identi…able. But holding a college degree is not such a clear signal of talent, as only the rich can a¤ord it.
If college enrollment increases while its cost is constant the signal's quality does not improve as the high cost of attending college implies we are scrapping the "bottom of the barrel" among wealthy people. More generally, this is true also when the cost of attending college decreases as long as it is high and the distribution of wealth is not concentrated at high values of wealth.
The marginal productivity of skilled labor decreases, though, relative to that of unskilled labor and, as a result, we may have a range in which increasing college attendance brings about a decrease of the wage premium.
Proposition 1 Under some assumptions, for Q su¢ ciently small, there exists a pooling equilibrium where all types of agents choose to go to college as soon as k Q.
To guarantee that the net bene…t of college attendance
is positive for all t, Q cannot be too high. A su¢ cient upper bound, b Q; is the solution (which exists) to
(ii) increasing in p(0); necessarily p(0) > 0;
The above proposition has nice implications about the trends of the college enrollment rate and of the skill premium, which are summarized below in Corollary 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 There is a cut-o¤ level of the initial wealth for a given t; k 0 (t);
so that for all agents whose endowment k 0 k 0 (t); they will choose college education at t. That is, the college enrollment rate is increasing over time.
Observe that all agents who haven't attended college accumulate capital in exactly the same fashion:
Therefore, k 0 (t) satis…es
where the evolution of k(s) follows
Obviously, k 0 (t) is decreasing over time along the equilibrium path.
Corollary 2
The wage gap is widening over time along the equilibrium path.
Proof Immediate from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
In fact, the equilibrium path is completely characterized in terms of the aggregate capital, K(t), and the cut-o¤ wealth level, k 0 (t):
where
given by (A2) and
with K(0) =
and k 0 (t) 0:
I will use this dynamic system to simulate the model in Section 3.
For P 2, I can establish the existence of the pooling equilibrium under even weaker assumptions. First, notice
Lemma 2 is valid for any ; ; and Q :
Lemma 2' For P 2; under the strategy pro…le that all types of agents go to college as soon as their current capital holdings k Q; ln(W =W ) is increasing in the fraction, x, of agents going to college.
Proposition 1' For P 2; under the assumption that Q < K(0), for Q suf…ciently small, there exists a pooling equilibrium where all types of agents choose to go to college as soon as k Q.
The two corollaries continue to hold and the dynamic system that characterize the equilibrium path remains valid with modi…ed production technology and prices.
Measuring the E¤ect of the Signals
The next question is how much this story can account for the growth in the skill premium. This is of course an empirical question, but here I will derive a theoretical bound of the force of the signals. A widely held opinion is that compositional change in the labor force has little e¤ect on the distribution of wage. This exercise addresses this concern theoretically and hopefully sheds some light on the kind of environment that makes the forces of signals strong.
Krusell et al. (2000) shows that the growth rate in the skill premium can be decomposed into three e¤ects, the relative quantity e¤ect, the relative e¢ ciency e¤ect, and the skill-capital-complementarity e¤ect:
In our context, for P 1; the above composition breaks down to:
The change in the distribution of signals leads to a change in the average talent given a signal, which amounts to a change in the e¢ ciency of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor. To maximize the e¤ect of the signals, we must choose the underlying parameters to maximize the relative e¢ ciency e¤ect g s g u :
Remark 2 (1) x(t) and x(t) are conveniently taken as given at each t.
Though they are endogenous variables, in the calibration I will choose the values for some free parameters to replicate the enrollment rate trend. So we may well take it as exogenous here.
(2) We allow G t ( ) and p t ( ) to be time-dependent. This maximizes the possible explanatory power of the signals and makes per period problem exactly the same. From now on, we will suppress the time subscript t.
Proposition 2
The e¤ ect of signals is bounded by the negative growth rate of the fraction of people that don't attend college:
This result suggests that the signals work most e¤ectively when the education can perfectly sort out the highest talents. Consider the following example in which there are only two talents, 1 or 0.
Example 1 There is a fraction of " (close to 0) of people with talent of 1 and the remaining are of talent 0. As a result, E( ) = ". Suppose people with high talent can pass the exam almost surely, while people with low talent have the probability of success decreasing overtime in the following fashion:
Note that at each instant of time the probability of success is still weakly increasing in the talents. The exam costs nothing. Then, one can verify
; as " ! 0:
Note that in this example, the sorting mechanism becomes more and more e¢ cient overtime, which also contributes to the growth of the skill premium. This veri…es that the suggested bound can be achieved in the limit in the example. However, in the setting where the probabilities of success are constant overtime, we would expect in general slower growth in skill premium. The bottom line is that in an economy in which the distribution of degrees is highly upward skewed, the education signal has a bigger force. The signals, theoretically, can account for all of the growth in skill premium. But as will be clear in Section 3, our hands are tied signi…cantly by the speci…cation and parameterization of the model.
Optimality
In the current environment, there are two potential sources of ine¢ ciency: the information problem represented by the private information of talents and the problem of missing credit market. We will investigate the consequences of these two problems one by one. In both cases, the objective of the social planner is to maximize period total output.
Benchmark One: Complete Information
Assume a social planner observes the individual talents. For P 1, the social planner simply chooses so that all agents with talent above are educated at a cost Q:
This problem is not a conventional concave problem and the solution is messy. To retain tractability, let = 1:
Proposition 3 Consider = 1 with P 1: In cases in which 2 1 holds or both 2 < 1 and (1 2 ) p( ) < Q hold ; it is optimal not to provide education at all.
If 2 < 1 and (1 2 ) p( ) Q, the optimal cut-o¤ in talent is given by
In cases where production relies more on the unskilled labor than on the skilled labor, or in cases where the opportunity cost of investing in education is high, it may be optimal not to provide education at all. But with incomplete information, there may still exist pooing equilibria de…ned in section 2.2.3. The individual incentive to self-signal the talent causes both misallocation of factors and a waste of resources. More generally, in all of the pooling equilbria, after some …nite length of time, the economy will always over-invest in education, even though it may never reach the optimal amount of skilled labor even in the limit.
With P 2, the talents are irrelavant since talents are perfectly substitutable and the social planner simply uses all available resources.
Proposition 3' For P 2, the social planner employs all labor and capital and the period output is
The point is that with complete information, there is no need to invest in education, if education serves purely as a signal, as is in the case with P 2:
Benchmark Two: Relaxing Borrowing Constraints
In this section, agents of the same generation are allowed to borrow from each other. Let b(t) be the amount of debt (or credit) that the agent acquires before he receives his income, which has to be paid back at the end of that period.
De…nition 2 Equilibrium with within-generation credit markets

An equilibrium of this economy is a list (c(t); k(t); sh(t); b(t); R(t); W (t); W (t))
for each agent ( ; k 0 ); given initial capital distribution F ( ) and distribution of talent G( ) and the exogenous positive saving rate and the production technology; so that (i) Agents optimally choose sh(K(t)) and b(t), given R(t); W (t); W (t);
(iii) Factor markets clear;
(iv) Credit markets clear:
Notice that Lemma 1 still holds. It is easy to construct an equilibrium in which all agents go to college from day 1.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-3 and P 1, for Q su¢ ciently small, there exists an equilibrium in which all agents go to college from day 1.
In this equilibrium, the college attendance rate is always 1 and the wage gap remains unchanged
It is clear from the proof that for all economies that have an equilibrium with borrowing constraints as de…ned in De…nition 1, there is also an equilibrium with with-in generation credit markets as de…ned in De…nition 2, in which there is full attendance. Indeed, the equilibrium with with-in generation credit markets is easier to support in the sense that it can exists for even higher cost of education. Now the evolution of the aggregate capital is described by
For the same set of parameters, the equilibrium with within generation credit markets has more skilled labor, less unskilled labor and less capital.
Hence, only in an economy where skilled labor is very productive, the relaxing borrowing constraint may bring about more output. More generally, from a social planner's point of view, relaxing borrowing constraint does not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement with transfers, since this allows for more competition through unproductive signals. The equilibrium without credit markets converges to the benchmark equilibrium in the limit.
Calibration
In this section, I calibrate the model and compare the simulated college premium with its data counterpart. I …rst discuss the source and construction of the data, methodology and the results follow.
Data
The relevant data series are the log wage gap between college graduates and high school graduates, the college enrollment rate and the college completion rate. More detailed description is in the appendix.
Skill premium. The point is that the college premium in the model is cohort-based. That is, the theory predicts that for cohorts that are born more recently when the signaling e¤ect of a degree is stronger face higher
premium than what earlier cohorts face. I computed the wage series using 
Calibration
The complication of the simulation lies in the fact that the model involves the unobservable talent. Therefore, instead of asking how much of the skill premium can be explained by the signals, I ask how much signals can matter if the unobservables behave in the most favorable way for me. This leads to a two-stage strategy, which I will specify next.
General Procedure
1st stage estimation. Assume that the average talent conditional on having a college degree follows a linear trend.
In words, if the college education becomes more e¢ cient in discriminating talents, the skill content associated with a college degree must be
higher. This provides another engine of growth in skill premium. Alternatively, one can interpret the trend as representing the human capital accumulation aspect of the education process. Then, would be a measure of the technological change in the relative skill of the workers. We will see the estimates of is fairly small.
I use a non-linear-least-square model of the evolution of the wage gap for both production functions. For P 1, I normalize E = h 0 = 1, take = 1 3 , and jointly estimate ; and . For P 2, I take = 
Simulation of the Calibrated Model P1
The …rst stage estimation for P1 yields = 0:4665% 4 : To gain a sense of the magnitude of ; imagine at the initial period, the college degree has no signal value, then by the 33rd period, the average talent of the college graduates will have grown to about 1.15 times the average talent.
In the second stage, I calibrate the model as follows. 
Conclusion and Extension
Though the idea of education as a job market signal is well known, its application to the evolution of wage distribution hasn't been well articulated in theory. This paper is such an attempt. I have developed a model with agents heterogeneous in initial wealth and talent, who make schooling decisions. The growth in the college enrollment rate makes a college degree a better signal of high talent. If talent is useful in production, the college degree will be rewarded a higher premium. This brings about a growing wage gap between college graduates and high school graduates. The model is calibrated, with two speci…cations of production technologies. In both cases, the model has the potential to explain a fair amount of growth of the college premium under reasonable parameterization. Simplistic as it may seem, the theory has a big potential to explain a wider range of phenomena and has a few directions for extension.
College Premium or Degree Premium
One immediate extension is to extend the two dimensional choice variable to the multidimensional choice of getting bachelor's, master's or doctor's degree. In the similar spirit, the framework can also be easily adapted to explaining the increasingly high premium of attending elite colleges.
Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) argues that the most important group contributing to the increase in the college wage premium is workers with a postgraduate degree. This is consistent with my theory. The increase in the number of Bachelor's degrees issued will demand even higher degrees to e¤ectively signal one's talent, which leads to the growing graduate school premium. It is conceivable that with a continuum of choice of levels of education, that varies from low quality colleges to the Ph.D. programs in top universities, the distribution of the education premium to each will tend to fan out over time as the signals work their way through the distribution.
On the other hand, consider the elite universities and colleges. By casual observation, the best schools are becoming more and more accessible to the high talented students, thanks to more e¤ective admission processes and more generous …nancial aid. As a result, the degree of elite schools must have become more correlated with talent than before. To estimate the premium of the 'ivy-league' and observe its evolution over time would be an interesting empirical question.
College Admission and Financing
Another way of extending the model is, instead of taking the cost of going to college exogenous, modeling the supply side of the college education. The key to the growing enrollment rate is the relaxation of household budget constraint over time through capital accumulation. But in reality there may be other ways that achieve the same e¤ect. One example is the relaxation of the borrowing constraints, as is studied in Hendel, Shapiro and Willen
Incorporating a sector of college will be a …rst step toward a general equilibrium approach. Colleges maximize some objective function by choosing costly admission processes. They can either admit students without much screening or undertake costly selection procedure. Colleges can be endowed with reputation such that in the equilibrium some reputedly good colleges choose to be more selective, but will be compensated by higher prices they charge the students. Students in turn will be compensated by the top college premium. The story is more relevant if we can document the growing tuitions of top-notch schools and the growing returns to elite education.
Optimal Saving Decision
Finally, the model can also be extended toward a full dynamic model, in which agents optimize over consumption and saving. Intuitively, this will help us more, because since the skill premium is growing over time, for subjective discount rate that is not too high, later cohorts will optimally choose to save more, which will allow their children to go to even fancier colleges or allow them to pursue postgraduate degrees, that will further enlarge the associated higher education premium. Combine a full dynamic model with a multiple or even continuum choice of levels of education would certainly make it a more elaborate model, though possibly analytically intractable.
One would want to pay the extra cost of computation for more precise quantitative and policy-oriented analysis. After all, the parsimonious model we have here lays out the essential economic intuition just as well.
Appendix
Theoretical Derivation
Lemma 1 If it is optimal for an agent with talent to go to college at t, then it is optimal for any agent who has talent greater than to go to college at t as long as his current capital holding k Q.
Proof The Bellman equations associated with going to college and not going to college, respectively, are:
Hence, the value function is simply the max of the two:
Given the wage o¤ers and return to capital, since it is optimal for(k 0 ; ) to go to college,
Hence, independent of the state variable k, (k 0 ; 0 ) would always prefers college as long as going to college is feasible, i.e. k Q: Q.E.D.
:
Lemma 2 For P 1, under the strategy pro…le that all type of agents go to college as soon as their current capital holdings k Q; and under Assumption 1, the wage gap ln(W =W ) is increasing in the fraction of agents, x, that go to college.
Proof Under the speci…ed strategy pro…le, the output and factor prices are
This implies that ln( W W ) is increasing in x. Note that 8Q; Assumption 1 is not empty. Q.E.D.
Assumption 2
1
(
Assumption 2 guarantees W (t) > W (t). Proof The key is to verify that in the suggested equilibrium, all agents optimally make the schooling decision. By Lemma 1, it is su¢ cient to look at the agent with the lowest talent and make sure he prefers to go to college. Suppose the college attendance is growing over time.
where , as is de…ned in Lemma 2, is positive. Assumption 2 and
By Assumption 3
with (0) = 0; lim
and by Assumption 2,
then there exists a b Q such that
So by Lemma 1, for Q su¢ ciently small, all agents want to go to college as soon as they can a¤ord it. Lastly, for all those who are constrained,
This implies that indeed in the equilibrium there will be an increasing fraction of people who can a¤ord education. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 There is a cut-o¤ level of the initial wealth for a given t so that for all agents whose endowment is above the cut-o¤ level,k 0 (t); they will choose college education at t. That is, the college enrollment rate is increasing over time.
Proof An agent starts to go to college at time t that satis…es
where the evolution of k i follows
At time t the faction of agents that goes to college is
which is increasing in t; since k i 0 (t) is decreasing in t: Q.E.D.
The gross output is
By the same token, there exists e Q; s.t.
For all Q e Q;
Moreover, when this is the case, there will be indeed an increasing number of agents going to college. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2
The e¤ ect of signals is bounded by the negative growth rate of fraction of people that don't attend college:
Proof I proceed in three steps.
Step 1: Transformation.
which necessarily satis…es
The problem is equivalent to the transformed problem:
This problem can be further formulated as a two-step maximization. Given a;
Then maximize over all possible a.
Step 2: Change of variables.
Let
Integration by part gives
The problem can be rewritten as
Step 3: Maximization. It is decreasing in y( ): Hence, at the optimum, y( ) = a and R 0 y( )d = 0. In both cases, the maximum of the objective function is
Now maximize with respect to a,
Q.E.D.
If 2 < (1 ) and (1 2 ) p( ) Q, the optimal cut-o¤ in talent is given by
Proof Di¤erentiate the objective function with respect to :
If 2 1 ; maximum is obtained at = :
Otherwise, …rst oder necessary condition requires for
SOC at gives
Hence ( ) is a local maximum. To check the global optimality, compare it with (0) and ( ):
Hence, achieves the global maximum. Q.E.D.
Proof Immediate. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-3 and for Q su¢ ciently small, there exists an equilibrium in which all agents go to college from day 1.
Proof
The agents'problem is now as follows.
If an agent goes to college,
If not,
The value function is de…ned by
By the same logic as in Proposition 1, I need to check whether 8t;
Now the factor prices in the proposed equilibrium are
By Assumptions 1-3,
It is readily seen that b Q > b Q: shows. I take Q to be the average over all these years, which is 5467. 
